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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V 
V. 
JAMES DELUNA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20000787-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Officer Daniels' affidavit for a 
search warrant was insufficient to support probable cause for several reasons. First, the 
informants who provided information set forth in the affidavit were not entitled to the 
presumption of reliability. Specifically, the informants ("CFM" and "niece #2") made 
incriminating statements against Deluna based on information they received from "niece 
#7." "Niece #1" lived with Deluna and had access to items used to implicate him in the 
crimes. Her unexplained involvement should have compelled further investigation and is 
not entitled to the presumption of reliability. For that reason, the informants' secondhand 
reports based on information from "niece #1" likewise are not entitled to the presumption. 
Second, the affidavit failed to otherwise establish the veracity and reliability of the 
informants and their reports. And third, Daniels failed to corroborate any aspect of the 
informants' allegations in this case. Under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 
failed to support probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. 
In response to Deluna's arguments on appeal, the state claims the following: First, 
the informants were concerned citizens with no interests in the matter; they were entitled 
to the presumption of reliability. (State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief) at 14.) That 
is incorrect. See infra Point A, herein. Second, "niece # 7fs" statements to the informants 
provided them with firsthand knowledge of Deluna's alleged criminal conduct. (State's 
Brief at 15-16.) That argument should be disregarded. See infra Point B., herein. Third, 
information in the affidavit concerning Deluna's prior conviction for a drug offense is 
sufficient to support probable cause in this case. (See State's Brief at 16-19.) That 
argument conflicts with State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640,644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). In that regard, the state urges this Court to 
overrule Brooks and its progeny. (State's Brief at 18-19.) As set forth below, the state's 
argument to that effect is insufficient and must be rejected. See infra. Point C, herein. 
In sum, since the affidavit for the search warrant failed to establish probable cause, 
it cannot be upheld on appeal. In addition, because the officer who prepared the affidavit 
executed the warrant, the good-faith exception may not apply in this matter. As a remedy, 
Deluna respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion 
to suppress and remand this case to the trial court either for a new trial with suppression 
of the unlawfully seized evidence, or for dismissal of the matter in its entirety. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AFFIDAVIT 
CANNOT SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANT. THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED UNDER THE WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
In considering whether an affidavit is sufficient to support a search warrant, state 
and federal courts assess the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
2 
213, 238 (1983); State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017,1019-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see 
also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 
127, 129-30 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258,1261 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,286 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
That analysis considers whether the informants are reliable, whether they have 
made firsthand observations of criminal conduct, whether they have provided sufficient 
detail about the alleged conduct to the officer, and whether the officer has corroborated 
the informants' story with independent investigation. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see U.S. v. 
McKinnev, 143 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 918 (1998). 
In this case, Officer Daniels' affidavit identified the informants as MCFMfl and 
"niece #2." According to the affidavit, the informants were related to "niece #1," a 
woman who lived with Deluna and had access to items of criminal conduct found in the 
apartment. The informants specifically implicated only Deluna in their reports (see R. 
139), and "niece #1" was never questioned regarding her involvement in the matter. 
The reports in this case required detail and corroboration. Daniels should have 
contacted "niece #1" to investigate her involvement in the matter, her motives for 
involving family members to implicate Deluna in criminal conduct, and her knowledge of 
the items allegedly located in the apartment she shared with Deluna. Daniels failed to 
engage in such an investigation. Indeed, he failed to corroborate any aspect of the reports 
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except to verify the address of the apartment. (R. 243:26.) That was insufficient. The 
state's arguments for upholding the warrant should be disregarded as set forth below. 
A. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIMS, VERACITY AND 
RELIABILITY MAY NOT BE ASSUMED IN THIS CASE. INDEED. IT IS 
PLAIN FROM THE AFFIDAVIT THAT THE INFORMANTS WERE 
PROVIDING INFORMATION TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM "NIECE #L" 
WHOSE TIES TO THE APARTMENT WERE PLAIN. AND WHOSE 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MATTER WAS NEVER EXPLAINED. 
1. The Informants Here Were Not Entitled to the Presumption of Reliability. 
The state claims that here, the reliability of the informants can be assumed because 
the informants were "concerned citizens." (State's Brief at 14.) In support of that claim, 
the state relies on distinguishable cases that can be categorized as follows: First, the infor-
mant had no personal ties to the criminal conduct or to the individual implicated in the 
matter. Thus, the "disinterested" informant was entitled to the presumption of reliability. 
Second, the informant was willing to implicate himself and/or a family member in 
criminal conduct. Thus, those statements against interest were deemed trustworthy. 
Those circumstances do not exist here, as further explained below. 
(a) If an Informant Has No Personal Interest in a Report of Criminal Conduct, He 
Is a "Concerned Citizen " and Afforded the Presumption of Reliability. 
The state has cited to Kavsville City v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231,235 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), cert denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997), in connection with its claim that "CFM" 
and "niece #2" were concerned citizens. (See State's Brief at 14.) In that case, De Wayne 
Olsen reported that a drunk individual "had been at his front door and had driven away in 
a white car - a Toyota Celica, maybe.'" Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 233. Olsen reported that 
4 
he believed the driver's name was "Joe" and he thought he had a telephone number for 
the driver. This Court considered Olsen's report to be "high on the reliability scale," since 
Olsen was an uninvolved citizen. Id. at 237. 
Next, the state relies on City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), cert denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). There, Rick Hafen was working at 
the drive-through window at an Arby's restaurant, when he observed a customer pull up 
in his car with a "can of Keystone beer" in his lap. Id. at 167. While Hafen was 
collecting the customer's money, he saw the customer drink the beer. Hafen called police 
and reported "that a driver with an open container in a small white Dodge pickup with a 
camper shell had just gone through Arby's drive-through window." Hafen provided a 
description of the vehicle and license plate number. Id at 167. This Court considered the 
information reliable because Hafen had given his name and details of the matter. Id. at 
169. Further, Hafen provided objective facts and was not motivated by "self interest." Id. 
Utah courts are more willing to assume reliability when the informant is a 
"disinterested" person without personal ties to or motives in reporting the alleged crime. 
See Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (informant was reliable, where he provided details based on 
his personal observations, and was "disinterested" in the matter); Purser. 828 P.2d at 516 
(informant assisted officer in controlled buys, he provided details of criminal conduct that 
were corroborated by officer, and he was a disinterested party). The informants in 
Deluna's case were not "disinterested" parties or "concerned citizens" as that term is used 
in Mulcahy, Carter, Purser, and Bailey. In fact, their reports of criminal conduct 
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specifically diverted attention from their family member, who had direct ties to the 
criminal conduct, as further set forth herein. See infra. Point A.l.(c). 
(b) According to the Second Set of Cases Identified by the State, an Informant 
Who Implicates His Own Interests May Be Deemed Reliable. 
In the second category of cases cited by the state (State's Brief at 14), the infor-
mants were willing to implicate themselves or family members in the report of criminal 
conduct. In State v. Blaha. 851 P.2d 1205,1207-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court 
considered the informants reliable where their reports concerning defendant's drug deals 
did not divert attention from the informants' husband/son. Indeed, the informants 
provided information that directly implicated a family member in the criminal conduct. 
Id. at 1208; see also Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(2) (a party's statement against interest is 
deemed reliable in evidentiary matters). 
Blaha is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. In State v. McCloskey. 
453 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1990), an informant went to the sheriffs office, met face-to-face 
with an officer and expressed concern that defendant was selling drugs to juveniles. The 
informant admitted that s/he purchased drugs from defendant and s/he provided details, 
including an accurate description of crack cocaine, to officers. Id. at 701. The informant 
agreed to meet with officers the next day to assist in their investigation, which s/he did. 
In assessing the matter, the court in McCloskey stated that "the informant here did 
not qualify as a citizen informant [with] presumed reliability," ]d. at 703, because s/he had 
retained some level of anonymity and had ties to the criminal conduct at issue. Id. at 703. 
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Nevertheless, in assessing whether reliability had been established, the court considered it 
significant that the informant was not cooperating with officers in order to curry favor 
with them. Indeed, the informant was "in a position" to be held criminally accountable. 
Id. at 704. S/he was "not a blame shifter but someone who simply came forward." Id at 
703. The court also considered it relevant that the informant would meet personally with 
officers rather than hide behind the anonymity of a telephone call. Li at 704. 
In Commonwealth v. Parapar, 534 N.E.2d 1167 (Mass. 1989), the court recognized 
when an informant makes statements against his own interests, credibility is established: 
We have previously stated that an informant's declaration against his or her penal 
interest is a factor that a magistrate may properly consider in determining probable 
cause. [UnitedStates v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 585, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2083,29 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971).] The Supreme Court has stated: "People do not lightly admit 
a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their 
own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary 
interests, carry their own indicia of credibility - sufficient at least to support a 
finding of probable cause to search." Id. Commonwealth v. Vynorius, supra 369 
Mass. at 21, 336 N.E.2d 898 (incriminating admissions by one who participates in 
a crime carry their own indicia of credibility). 
Parapar, 534 N.E.2d at 1169 (cites omitted). 
If an informant is willing to implicate herself or her family in criminal conduct, her 
statements against interest weigh in favor of reliability. That situation did not occur here. 
In Deluna's case, the informants were "blame shifters"; they implicated Deluna in crime, 
while diverting attention from "niece #1," who lived in the apartment. (See State's Brief 
at 5 (identifying "niece #1" as a "live-in girlfriend").) Thus, in this case, a separate 
showing of reliability and knowledge was required to support probable cause. 
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(c^ If an Informant Is Seeking to Divert Attention from His Conduct or Interests to 
Implicate Another in Crime, the Informant's Report Is Not Afforded the 
Presumption of Reliability: the Magistrate Will Be Required to Assess Whether 
Information in the Affidavit Establishes Reliability to Support Probable Cause. 
This Court has ruled that in certain cases, an informant's reliability and veracity 
may be assumed, for example, when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from 
police in exchange for information, or when the informant is willing to implicate his own 
interests in the matter. See Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; supra. Points A.l.(a), (b), herein. 
In cases where the presumption may not apply, the supporting affidavit must "set 
forth in detail the basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability of [the] person supplying 
information in order to establish probable cause." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. The 
informant's report must be based on "personal observation," and it must contain a detailed 
account of the criminal conduct. In addition, the affidavit must establish that the 
investigating officer corroborated significant facts before the officer may gain access into 
a person's home with a warrant. Id (cites omitted). 
Under the circumstances of this case, where the presumption of reliability is 
inapplicable, the affidavit was required to set forth "the basis of knowledge, veracity and 
reliability" of the informants. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. The affidavit was required to set 
forth firsthand accounts of the criminal conduct with sufficient detail. 
By way of explanation, in State v. Stevens. 989 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1999), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the distinction between an ordinary "citizen 
informant" and an informant who had ties to the alleged criminal conduct. The court 
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stated that information from an "ordinary citizen" is presumed to be reliable, and the 
affidavit need not establish that the source is credible or that the information is reliable, 
id at 291, while information from a citizen who may be seeking some concession, either 
by way of "payment or simply out of revenge against the subject," is not entitled to the 
presumption. "The nature of these [latter] persons and the information which they supply 
convey a certain impression of unreliability, and it is proper to demand that some 
evidence of their credibility and reliability be shown." Id at 294. 
In Stevens, an informant contacted police, provided his name, and reported to 
officers that defendant was involved in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory at a 
specific address. The informant described equipment used for the methamphetamine 
operation and he described the cooking process in detail. Based on the information, the 
officers obtained a warrant and executed it against defendant's residence. Id. at 292. 
In assessing the matter on appeal, the court refused to provide the informant with 
the presumption of reliability and veracity, since he failed to explain why he was in the 
house while methamphetamine was being cooked. W. at 294. The court in Stevens 
required additional information in the affidavit to support reliability. 
Thus, Stevens supports that when an informant is able to divert attention from his 
own conduct by pointing a finger at someone else, the informant is not entitled to the 
presumption of reliability. The affidavit must contain specific information to support the 
credibility of the informant in that instance. 
In Dolliver v. State. 598 N.E.2d 525 (Ind. 1992), the court determined that a 
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warrant lacked probable cause in part because an unidentified informant seemed to have a 
personal vendetta against defendant. There was some indication that the informant was 
angry at defendant for the way he had treated the informant's sister and ex-girlfriend. In 
addition, the informant failed to identify any personal observation that would support his 
allegations concerning the matter. The court refused to find that the informant was reli-
able, in part, due to his personal reasons for going after defendant. Id at 527-28; see 
also State v. MickeL 765 P.2d 331, 332-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (informant failed to 
explain her involvement in the crime and did not implicate herself in reports to police 
concerning defendant's criminal conduct; therefore, she was not deemed reliable). 
In Deluna's case, "CFM" had a relationship with and obtained information about 
the alleged criminal conduct from "niece #1." "Niece #1" was Deluna's live-in girlfriend 
and had access to the incriminating evidence that she claimed belonged to Deluna. There 
is some indication here that "niece #1" had a vendetta against Deluna and implicated him 
in criminal conduct out of revenge. (See R. 246:187-88 (here, the possible vendetta was 
confirmed with further investigation and evidence at trial)); Dolliver, 598 N.E.2d at 528 
(informant with possible vendetta could not be trusted); Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294-95 
(informant was not entitled to presumption, where s/he failed to explain presence in the 
apartment during crime; additional, detailed facts served to support informant's reliability 
and basis of knowledge); see also LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure, § 3.4(a) (3d ed. 1996), 
text at note 46 (to the extent there is a duty on the part of the police to check the reliability 
of statements made by an informant, that duty "probably exists in those circumstances 
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[where] it appears that, because of some prior relationship between the [informant] and 
the accused, there exists a motive for a false accusation"). 
In addition, the informants failed to explain "niece # lfs" involvement in the matter 
and her involvement with items of criminal conduct. Indeed, the informants here were 
specific in pointing a finger at Deluna and they were successful in diverting attention 
from "niece #1" and her ties to the apartment. See Mickel 765 P.2d at 333 (where 
informant failed to explain presence during crime, s/he could not be deemed reliable). 
Since "niece #1" cannot be deemed reliable, her reports do not gain veracity because they 
were delivered secondhand by her uncle, "CFM." (See R. 139 ("CFM" obtained 
information from nieces and other family members).) Thus,"CFM's" secondhand reports 
cannot be deemed reliable. (See Brief of Appellant at Point A.2.(a) and (b).) 
Inasmuch as "CFM" was not entitled to the presumption of reliability, the affidavit 
was required to set forth in detail his basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability to estab-
lish probable cause. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. It failed to do so. (See Brief of Appellant, 
Point A.2.(a), (b)); Mickel 765 P.2d at 333 (affidavit identifying informant as resident 
and business/property owner was not enough to support credibility). That is insufficient. 
With respect to "niece #2," she refused to contact or meet with Daniels and to 
identify herself. Thus, she is not considered to be "a concerned citizen." See supra Point 
A.I., herein. In addition, "niece #2" is similar to the informant in Stevens where she 
reported that Deluna was involved in methamphetamine production without explaining 
her involvement in the matter and "why [she] was in the house while methamphetamine 
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was being cooked." Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294; MickeL 765 P.2d at 333; Mulcahv. 943 
P.2d at 235 n.2 (a person who gains information through involvement in criminal activity 
is lower on the reliability scale). "Niece # 2's" report conveyed a "certain impression of 
unreliability." Stevens, 989 S.W.2d at 294. Thus, the affidavit was required to "set forth 
in detail" her basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability. Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. It 
failed to do so. (See Brief of Appellant at Point A.2.(c).) That is insufficient. 
2. Additional Information Contained in the Affidavit Did Not Support the 
Reliability of the Informants or the Veracity of the Information They Provided. 
Since the informants were not entitled to the presumption of reliability, the affida-
vit was required to set forth in detail the basis of their knowledge and credibility in order 
for officers to access the house via the warrant. Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. It failed to do so. 
Specifically, with respect to "CFM," additional information contained in the 
affidavit included a conclusory statement that he identified himself to Daniels as a police 
officer. (R. 139.) Daniels did not corroborate that claim. (See R. 243:4-27, generally). 
Also, according to the affidavit, "CFM" had knowledge of meth "manufacturing 
and related paraphernalia." (R. 139.) The affidavit is silent as to any detail regarding that 
statement. Where the court in Stevens upheld the reliability of the informant based on the 
details in the affidavit, the lack of detail here compels a different result. See Stevens, 989 
S.W.2d at 294-95 (while informant's reliability was not presumed, "basis of knowledge" 
was established with specific details supporting informant's familiarity with equipment 
used and cooking process for meth); see also Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. The conclusory 
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statements here are insufficient. See State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989) 
(citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 239); State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). There is no way in this matter to assess "CFM's" basis of knowledge or 
credibility. His statements lack reliability and fail to support probable cause. 
As for "niece #2," additional information in the affidavit failed to support her 
reliability. "Niece #2" refused to meet with Daniels. Instead, he called her using a num-
ber provided by "CFM." Daniels was unable to confirm "niece #2fs" identification and 
unable to observe her demeanor in order to make any assessment of trustworthiness. In 
addition, although "niece #2" reported that she witnessed Deluna "put the lab into the 
footlocker," saw him use "items" in the closet, and witnessed "the suspect manufacturing 
methamphetamine in the apartment" (R. 139), those reports lacked detail. They were 
conclusory. That is insufficient. See BabbelL 770 P.2d at 990-91; Droneburg, 781 P.2d 
at 1304-05; Stevens. 989 S.W.2d at 294-95 (informant's detail supported reliability). 
The informants in this case were aware that "niece # 1" lived with Deluna and had 
access to the items of alleged criminal conduct that she used to implicate Deluna in this 
matter. Yet, the informants made conclusory, incomplete reports to Daniels to ensure 
attention was not focused on her. (See R. 139.) Where the informants disclosed 
information in a way to ensure their own family member would not be investigated, the 
informants left an impression of unreliability. In addition, the reports were not supported 
by adequate or reliable firsthand observations and they failed to contain sufficient detail. 
There is no basis in this case for assessing the reliability of the informants or the 
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information they provided. In that regard, the affidavit is insufficient. 
3. Contrary to the State's Assertions, Deluna Properly Preserved His Challenges to 
the Affidavit and Warrant. The Trial Judge Had the Original, Completed Affidavit 
Before Him When He Ruled on the Total Circumstances. 
The state claims that Deluna failed to properly preserve his argument that "CFM" 
and the nieces were not entitled to the presumption of reliability and veracity in this case. 
(State's Brief at 19-20.) The state's argument is without merit. In the lower court pro-
ceedings, Deluna challenged the affidavit and warrant as insufficient. He argued that 
"CFM" and the nieces were not reliable. (R. 134-135; 250:7-10.) The trial court ruled 
against Deluna and specifically reached the issue of the informants' reliability. The trial 
court ruled that the informants were "concerned citizens" under the law, and their infor-
mation was to "be given more weight than a confidential informant." (R. 250:14.) The 
trial court erred in its ruling. (See Brief of Appellant at Point A.2; supra Points A.I., 2.) 
The issue was properly preserved for appeal. "A matter is sufficiently raised if it 
has been submitted to the trial court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law." James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1997); State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (trial court must rule on issue for preserva-
tion). There are no procedural barriers to this Court's review of the matter on the merits. 
B. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT THE INFORMANTS BASED THEIR 
REPORTS ON PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. THAT IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD. ALSO, THE REPORTS FROM "NIECE #2" WERE 
INSUFFICIENT AND CONCLUSORY. 
The state claims that "CFM" had "personal knowledge" of matters. (State's Brief 
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at 15-16.) That claim is insupportable. "Personal knowledge" is defined as "knowledge 
gained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based 
on what someone else has said." Black's Law Dictionary 877 (7th ed. 1999). As set forth 
above, and in the opening brief, "CFM" obtained his information concerning defendant 
and the items of alleged criminal conduct from other sources, including "[unidentified] 
family members," "niece # 1," and "niece #2." (See Brief of Appellant at Point A.) 
There is no indication from the affidavit that CFM ever met Deluna, personally 
knew him, could describe him, or had any knowledge based on observations of him. 
Indeed, "CFM's" claims of criminal conduct against Deluna consisted only of second and 
thirdhand reports from family members, including the nieces, who had ties to the conduct. 
(R. 139.) The affidavit fails to support that "CFM" had personal knowledge of the 
matter. Thus, his reports are irrelevant to the probable cause determination. See Salt 
Lake Citv v. Truiillo. 854 P.2d 603, 604-05, 607 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (information 
received secondhand from Informants Two and Three would not support probable cause). 
As for "niece # 2," while she claimed to have personal knowledge of criminal 
conduct, as set forth above and in the opening Brief, Daniels had no opportunity to assess 
her credibility and/or reports of firsthand knowledge, either personally or historically, 
since "niece # 2" refused to meet with Daniels and failed to provide any details regarding 
her alleged observations. (See Brief of Appellant at Point A.2.(c).) In addition, "niece 
#2" had unexplained involvement with the manufacturing process. 
In this case, the state has failed to adequately address the lack of "personal know-
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ledge" infecting the affidavit. It relies only on cases that are distinguishable. (State's 
Brief at 15-16 (citing Purser. 828 P.2d at 516-17 (court upheld warrant where informant 
reported his personal observations); Blaha. 851 P.2d at 1206 (although informant had 
never been inside defendant's apartment, she had driven to the apartment with her hus-
band to buy drugs that he ingested or injected after leaving the apartment; informant had 
been at the apartment late in the evening and had observed heavy drug trafficking at those 
hours; officer corroborated report in many ways, including observing drug-trafficking 
patterns at the apartment)).) On that basis, the affidavit fails to support probable cause. 
C. THE ONLY REMAINING FACT CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVIT RE-
LATES TO DELUNA'S PRIOR CONVICTION. THE STATE CLAIMS THAT 
IS A PROPER MATTER TO SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE, AND ASKS 
THIS COURT TO OVERRULE PRIOR CASES THAT HOLD OTHERWISE. 
Daniels also included a statement in the affidavit concerning Deluna's criminal 
history. The affidavit for the search warrant stated: "Your affiant conducted a criminal 
history check on James Deluna and found that he has been arrested and convicted for two 
counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance With the Intent to Distribute and Aggra-
vated Assault." (R. 139.) The affidavit was silent as to when Deluna was convicted. 
This Court has ruled that the suspect's criminal record "does nothing to establish 
that he is currently dealing in controlled substances," Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644, and such 
information is "not properly part of probable cause determinations." State v. Vigh, 871 
P.2d 1030,1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Brooks: State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952, 956 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Thus, Daniels' reference to Deluna's criminal history was 
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irrelevant, and the trial court's reliance on the matter was improper. (See R. 250:14.) 
The state disagrees with Deluna and has asked this Court to overrule Brooks. The 
state cites to State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), in support of its request. 
1. Menzies Articulates the Standard for Overruling Precedent in this Jurisdiction. 
In Menzies, the Utah Supreme Court overruled a "per se" reversal rule, which 
applied whenever a party was compelled "to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
[prospective juror] who should have been stricken for cause." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398 
(cite omitted). The "per se rule," which was recognized in Crawford v. Manning, 542 
P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), effectively supplanted the original prejudice analysis that 
traditionally applied to such juror issues. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. 
In its analysis to overrule Crawford and the (iper se rule," the Utah Supreme Court 
found that the rule was unworkable, and the justice who wrote Crawford inexplicably 
departed from a long line of Utah cases favoring the prejudice analysis. In addition, 
according to the court, Crawford was issued "with little analysis and without reference to 
authority" on the matter. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400. 
2. The State Claims that Under the Menzies Analysis, Brooks Should Be 
Overruled. The State's Argument Should Be Rejected. 
(a) The State's Argument Lacks Analysis. 
The state asserts that Brooks is subject to the same fate as the "per se rule" in 
Menzies. The state claims Brooks is "contrary to controlling United States Supreme 
Court and Utah case law recognizing that prior convictions are properly included in the 
17 
probable cause determination." (State's Brief at 17.) 
While the state has cited to numerous cases in connection with its claim, the state 
has failed to explain how those cases serve as precedent for the matter, and it has failed to 
analyze those cases in the context of its argument for overruling Brooks. (See State's 
Brief at 17-18.) On that basis, the state's argument should be disregarded. 
(b) The Cases Cited by the State Do Not Discuss Whether a Defendant's Prior 
Conviction May Be Sufficient to Support Probable Cause to Search 
The cases cited by the state cannot be interpreted as "controlling" authority on the 
relevant issue. By way of explanation, in Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 
(Utah 1989), plaintiff challenged a statute of repose as unconstitutional under the open 
courts clause of the Utah Constitution. On appeal, defendant claimed the statute had been 
upheld in an earlier case. The Utah Supreme Court found that argument unpersuasive 
since the earlier case could not be construed to have properly addressed the issue. 
[Defendant Buehner Concrete] asserts that this case is controlled by Good v. 
Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). In Good, the Court merely stated that the 
plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the statute. It did not specify which 
constitutional provisions were relied on. With no analysis, the opinion simply 
stated that "the claim is without merit." Id. at 225. The Court cited no authority 
and gave no reasons. Under these circumstances, the opinion can only be read to 
have disposed of a frivolous constitutional claim or what may have been a 
potentially meritorious constitutional claim that was presented in a frivolous 
manner. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d at 683, we stated, "Whether 
the Court [in Good] in fact addressed the merits of Article I section 11 is 
speculative, and the ruling, therefore, has little persuasive effect [upon the issue of 
the constitutionality of a statute of repose under Article I, section 11]." 
Accordingly, Good is not dispositive here. 
Horton, 785 P.2d at 1090; see State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68,16 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (state 
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relied on case law that was not dispositive). The doctrine in Horton applies here. It is 
speculative to claim that in the cases cited by the state, the court had the opportunity to 
analyze whether a defendant's criminal record was relevant to the probable cause 
determination. In that regard, the cases do not constitute controlling authority. 
Specifically, the state first cites to Jones v. U.S.. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). (State's 
Brief, 17.) In that matter, the Court considered whether an affidavit prepared by an inves-
tigating officer (the affiant) may be sufficient, where the affidavit set forth the firsthand 
observations of an informant rather than the personal observations of the affiant. The 
Court considered an investigating officer's affidavit to be sufficient. IdL at 267-69, 271. 
In Deluna's case, the state suggests the Jones Court upheld the search warrant 
based on an affidavit containing defendant's "history" for drug use. (State's Brief at 17.) 
That requires explanation. In Jones, the officer sought a warrant to search for drugs. He 
presented an affidavit that detailed the informant's observations, as well as reports from 
other sources that defendant used drugs, defendant admitted "to the use of narcotic drugs" 
and defendant had visible needle marks on his arm. Jd. at 267 n.2. The additional 
reports, defendant's admissions and the needle marks (i.e. the "history") corroborated the 
informant's firsthand reports. Significantly, the Jones Court did not analyze whether an 
affidavit may refer to a defendant's prior "criminal record" to establish probable cause for 
a search warrant. Thus, the Jones case does not provide support for overruling Brooks. 
The state also suggests that several Utah cases discuss the issue relevant here and 
constitute controlling authority contradicting Brooks. (State's Brief at 17.) That is 
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incorrect. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1204 (informant reported incriminating statements 
concerning a robbery made to him by defendant and he described stolen items; officer 
confirmed the robbery, the description of items taken, and ascertained that a second 
suspect had a "record for burglary and auto theft"; court did not analyze the relevance of 
the "record"); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 51, 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affidavit for 
warrant stated that suspects had a criminal record and history; defendant did not challenge 
those facts, but rather challenged omissions in the affidavit); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 
54, 55, 56-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (issued prior to Brooks: officer seeking warrant 
learned that defendant had previous drug conviction; no analysis of the matter on appeal), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 (courfs reference to 
the "substantial history" of drug violations related to the officer's extensive investigation 
over several months involving defendant's drug activities; no analysis of a "prior record" 
for defendant); Blaha, 851 P.2d at 1206-08 (no indication that suspect had prior narcotics 
arrest or record; in addition, defendant did not challenge such matters on appeal); State v. 
Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1382-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) {informant had criminal record, 
thus Court considered whether affidavit was sufficiently detailed to support informant's 
reliability). 
While the state has argued that this Court's ruling in Brooks is a departure from 
"well established case law acknowledging the legitimate bases for including prior con-
victions in a search warrant affidavit" (State's Brief at 18), the state has failed to identify 
any "established" case where the issue was discussed on the merits. See Horton, 785 P.2d 
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at 1090. Inasmuch as the state's cases do not contain any language to suggest the relevant 
issue was even raised on appeal, the only conclusion that may be reached is that the 
parties in those cases did not brief or argue the issue. Any other conclusion is 
speculative. The state has failed to make an argument for overruling Brooks, 849 P.2d at 
644; Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1033; Potter, 860 P.2d at 956; and State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 
137,143 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
In sum, the conclusory, secondhand reports — from informants who may not be 
afforded the presumption of reliability ~ fail to establish veracity, knowledge, and 
credibility in this matter. The affidavit lacks proper detail and corroborating investigation. 
On that basis, the affidavit is insufficient to support probable cause for the warrant. 
D. IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING 
THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION, THE STATE SIMPLY ARGUES THAT THE 
INFORMANTS WERE RELIABLE. 
The state claims that if the warrant lacked probable cause, the search may be 
upheld under the good-faith exception set forth in United State v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
922 (1984). The state's argument for application of that exception is as follows: "[F]or 
the same reasons defendant failed to show that the affidavit was inadequate to establish 
the veracity and reliability of the presumptively reliable concerned citizen informants, see 
[State's Brief at parts A-D], he fails to show that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of 
reliability that police acted unreasonably in relying on it." (State's Brief at 21-22.) 
Under the state's reasoning, if this Court finds that the affidavit failed to establish 
the reliability and veracity of the informants, for that same reason, the Court should find 
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that the officers were not justified in relying on the warrant. State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 
737 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("When the magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant is not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the 
warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers") (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-23), 
overruled on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992); see also State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 
708, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, in the event this Court determines 
the warrant lacked probable cause, the search may not be upheld under the good-faith 
exception. See Brief of Appellant, dated May 11,2001, at Point B. 
E. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT DELUNA WAS PREJUDICED 
BY THE STATE'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING THE 
SEARCH: INDEED. THE STATE ADDRESSES ONLY THE VALIDITY OF 
DELUNA'S STATEMENTS OBTAINED THEREAFTER. 
Deluna maintains that as a result of the unlawful search and seizure in this case, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, and remand 
the matter for further proceedings. Also, on remand, Deluna is entitled either (1) to a new 
trial with suppression of the unlawfully seized evidence; or (2) dismissal of the charges if 
this Court also finds that Deluna's statements to officers were tainted by the unlawful 
search. (See Brief of Appellant at Point C.) 
The state does not seem to dispute that if this Court finds error, Deluna is entitled 
at least to a new trial with suppression of the unlawfully seized evidence. (See State's 
Brief at 22-27.) Rather, with respect to the remedy, the state seems to argue only that 
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Deluna is not entitled to dismissal of the charges because his statements to officers during 
the search were not tainted. 
The state's argument for admissibility of the statements is based on the following: 
First, the state claims Deluna failed to properly preserve his argument that the unlawful 
search and seizure poisoned his statements to officers. Second, the state asserts Deluna's 
statements were not tainted by the illegal search because the informants were 
"presumptively reliable family members." Third, the state claims the corpus delicti rule 
does not prohibit the state from admitting Deluna's statements into evidence because the 
state may be able to corroborate the statements with other evidence.1 Deluna addresses 
each point as follows. 
With respect to the first point, the "taint" analysis is not a separate argument here, 
but is part and parcel of Deluna's Fourth Amendment prejudice analysis. See State v. 
Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688-91 (Utah 1990) (applying "taint" analysis or "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine to Fourth Amendment issue). In that regard, the issue was pro-
perly preserved as part of Deluna's argument that the search and seizure were unlawful. 
In addition, if this Court determines the warrant was not supported by probable 
cause, it would be necessary for this Court to fashion an appropriate remedy. See State v. 
1 The state also claims that "defendant failed to raise the corpus delicti issue below." 
(State's Brief at 25-26.) Yet, the record supports preservation. Indeed, Deluna filed a 
motion entitled, "Motion to Exclude Statements Made by Defendant." It stated the 
following: "This motion is made based on the lack of any corpus delicti to support the 
defendant's alleged statements." The motion identified the corpus delicti rule and case 
law on the issue and the trial court ruled on the matter. (R. 197-98; 246:132-33, 138.) 
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Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209-1211 (Utah 1993) (appellate court has the power and 
authority to dispose of a matter on appeal as it deems appropriate). To that end, it would 
be necessary to assess whether Deluna is entitled to a new trial, where the evidence seized 
during the unlawful search would be suppressed; or dismissal of the matter, where the 
unlawful search also poisoned Deluna's statements to officers. See Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 
690-91 & n.4 (Utah 1992) (applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine). 
Since the "taint" doctrine ultimately will have to be addressed, as a matter of 
judicial economy, it should be addressed here on the existing record. Indeed, the state has 
acknowledged that "the available record is adequate" (State's Brief at 23) for this Court 
to resolve the matter without remand for further proceedings. 
Next, the state seems to argue that Deluna's statements were not tainted because 
officers were entitled to rely on the warrant. (State's Brief at 24-25 (state argues that 
officers' conduct was proper where they relied on the warrant supported by statements 
from "presumptively reliable family members of defendant's then live-in girlfriend").) 
Based on that logic, if this Court determines that officers were not entitled to rely on the 
warrant (see supra Point D, herein), this Court also must find that Deluna's statements to 
officers were poisoned. The state's argument compels that result. In that instance, the 
statements would be deemed inadmissible and the case should be dismissed. 
Finally, with respect to the corpus delicti rule, the state acknowledges "there may 
be a corpus delicti issue here," where suppression of the physical evidence would render 
Deluna's statements inadmissible. (State's Brief at 25-26.) Notwithstanding the 
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concession, the state seems to claim that in a new trial, it may be able to produce 
additional evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Specifically, the state would call 
"niece # 2 to testify to her observations of meth lab equipment, and/or meth production." 
(State's Brief at 26.) The state fails to identify how "niece #2fs" unreliable, conclusory 
statements would serve to establish the elements for each charge in this case. (Id.) In 
that regard, the state's argument is both inadequate and speculative; it must be rejected. 
Since the existing record fails to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, Deluna respectfully 
requests the entry of an order reversing this case and remanding it in order that the trial 
court may dismiss the charges against Deluna.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and as set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, 
Deluna respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion 
to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the ruling. 
SUBMITTED thisiktday of fl^ft^ 2001. 
*^2z 
LINDA M.JONES 
OTIS STERLING, II! 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
2 The state also claims that notwithstanding the corpus delicti rule, the evidence is 
sufficient to support the convictions here based on Deluna's statements to officers. That 
is incorrect. If the seized evidence is excluded, the only remaining evidence is unreliable 
under the corpus delicti rule. (See Brief of Appellant, dated May 11, 2001, at 41-42.) 
That is insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
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